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NEPA'S PROGENY INHABIT THE STATES
-WERE THE GENES DEFECTIVE?t
DONALD G. HAGMAN*
This is the story of state provisions influenced by the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) .2 California's Environmental
Quality Act of 1970 (CEQA) 2 is the major vehicle for this story.
CEQA was the first NEPA-like act to be adopted by a state, and
probably has had more impact and been involved in more controversy
than any other state act. It has been construed in several reported
decisions, and in the wake of all this attention, CEQA has been
amended.
Part I of this article is descriptive. First, it explains in rather great
detail the story of CEQA. Second, it describes the principal statute
or other document that brought NEPA-like provisions to the other
states. Third, the article sets forth the cases, if any, that have con-
strued such provisions. Part II of this article is the editorial.
I. NEPA AND NEPA-Lu. STATE LAWS
NEPA became law on January 1, 1970. A little over a month later,
environmental litigants first demonstrated to a federal agency that
the Act had teeth.3 In the early days, all courts were not equally im-
t With the exception of the postscript, this article is an edited version of a speech
given at the annual banquet of the URBAN LAW ANNUAL on April 7, 1973, in St.
Louis.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
2. CAL. PuB. Ros. CODE §§ 21000-174 (West Supp. 1972), amending CAL.
PuB. Rns. CODE §§ 21000-21151 (West 1970).
3. Texas Comm. v. United States, I ERC 1303 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
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pressed,4 but assisted by the strong interim guidelines5 quickly pub-
lished by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ),0 environ-
mental plaintiffs began to find NEPA a reliable workhorse. Their
cases confirmed a tough stance, encouraging the CEQ to adopt rigor-
ous final guidelines.7 Moreover, any doubts that NEPA was a "paper
tiger" were dispelled on July 13, 1971, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Committee, Inc. v. AEC,8 a case which gave NEPA such a clarion call
to significance that almost everything that has since happened to
NEPA is anticlimactic.
NEPA attracted the attention of environmentalists at the state level
almost immediately. Bills were introduced for NEPA-like acts in
numerous states before the potency of NEPA-like legislation was
clearly apparent. A February 1, 1973, survey reported:
[I]t appears that 11 states (and Puerto Rico) currently have a
general state EIS [environmental impact statement] requirement
similiar to Section 102 of NEPA. Another seven states require
EIS for certain types of projects (e.g., wastewater treatment fa-
cilities; roads and highways). General EIS requirements are
under consideration in at least 18 states (and the District of
Columbia) .9
Partially because Puerto Rico adopted NEPA almost verbatim,
Puerto Rico passed the first NEPA-like act.1 0 The Act applied to
"all agencies of the government,"' 1 just as NEPA applied to "all
agencies of the Federal Government."' 2 The intent may have been
to apply the Act to local governments in Puerto Rico. On the other
hand, where "all agencies of the Federal Government" under NEPA
were directed to "make available to States, counties, municipalities"13
4. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp.
238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971).
5. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, 35
Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
6. The CEQ was created by 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
7. Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, 36 Fed.
Reg. 7724 (1971); revised in 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973).
8. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
9. T. Trzyna, Center for California Public Affairs, Survey of State Environ-
mental Policy Acts, Report No. 1, Feb. 1, 1973.
10. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1121-40 (Supp. 1973).
11. Id. § 1124.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
13. Id. § 4332 (F).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/2
NEPA EFFECTS
information about enhancing the environment, the Puerto Rican
agencies were directed to "offer municipalities"'14 such information,
raising at least an inference that local governments in Puerto Rico
were not required to prepare an environmental impact statement
(EIS) for their own actions.
A. CEQA-The Beginnings and Enactment
CEQA, which became the first NEPA-like state act, was introduced
in the California legislature three months after the passage of NEPA.
No one could have known at the time that it was to be called to sig-
nificance by Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors,5 the case
w.,hich called nationwide attention to CEQA.
As enacted into law on September 17, 1970, however, CEQA was
rather simple and uncomplicated. After a declaration of policy and
findings, the Act contained two operative chapters. The first applied
to all state agencies, boards and commissions and required a report
from them on any "project" they proposed which could have a sig-
nificant effect on the environmentYG The report was to contain a
statement on matters 7 substantially similar to those listed in the
requ irements of NEPA § 102 (2) (C) (i) - (v) .'1 Whenever state officials
commented on any federal "projects," the same statement on matters
was to be included.10 No state division could fund or request funds
unless the statement was provided.2 A "project" involving only plan-
ning was expressly excepted. The State Office of Planning and Re-
14. P.R. LAws ANNI. tit. 12 § 1124 (F) (Supp. 1973).
15. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). See note 115 and
accompanying text infra.
16. CAL. PuB. Rns. CODE § 21100 (West 1970).
17. Id. The statement on matters includes:
(a) The environmental impact of the proposed action.
(b) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the pro-
posal is implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact.
[This section not found in NEPA § 102(2) (C) (i)-(v).]
(d) Alternatives to the proposed action.
(e) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
(f) Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C)(i)-(v) (1970).
19. CAL. PUn. Ras. CODE § 21101 (West 1970).
20, Id. § 21102.
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search was directed to work with state, regional and local agencies to
develop implementing provisions.21 As with § 102 (2) (C) ot NEPA, the
preparing body was to consult with other knowledgeable state agen-
cies before making the statement. 2 The "environmental impact re-
port" (EIR) 2 and the comments from other governmental agencies
were to be a part of the regular "project" report used in the existing
review and budgetary process and be available to the legislature and
the general public.24 State divisions were directed to include in budget
requests funds sufficient to protect the environment from problems
created by their "activities" 25 and to let the Governor and legislature
know of any deficiencies in their present authority which would
hinder compliance with CEQA.2
The second operative chapter provided that state divisions allocat-
ing "state or federal funds on a project-by-project basis to local agen-
cies for ... projects ... shall," unless exempted by the implementing
guidelines, require an EIR from the local agency before disbursing
funds, except funds for planning purposes. 27
But that provision was a direction to state agencies as well as local
agencies. What of strictly local projects? CEQA provided:
The legislative bodies of all cities and counties which have an
officially adopted conservation element of a general plan shall
make a finding that any project they intend to carry out, which
may have a significant effect on the environment is in accord
with the conservation element of the general plan. All other local
governmental agencies shall make an environmental impact re-
port on any project they intend to carry out which may have a
significant effect on the environment and shall submit it to the
appropriate local planning agency as part of the report required
by Section 65402 of the Government Code.28
The second sentence of the section was a bit enigmatic. Did the
"all other local governmental agencies" mean cities and counties
21. Id. § 21103.
22. Id. § 21104.
23. In California, the document known as an environmental impact statement(EIS) under NEPA is called an environmental impact report (EIR).
24. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21105 (West 1970).
25. Id. § 21106. NEPA § 102(2) (C) uses the term "actions."
26. Id. § 21107. This section was repealed by CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 21107(West Supp. 1972).
27. CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE § 21150 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 21151.
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which had no conservation element? Or did it mean all types of local
agencies, such as school and special districts?
The reference to Section 65402 of the Government Code helped.
That section is a provision similar to that found in many state plan-
ning enabling laws, including A Standard City Planning Enabling
Act,21 whereby a planning commission is given power to review
acquisitions, disposals, vacations, abandonments, and construction by
public agencies. In California, the statute has three subsections. The
first applies to cities or counties. If a city or county acts, it must first
refer the matter to the local planning agency for review. The second
subsection has similar provisions for when the county acts within a
city or a city acts within a county-the planning agency of the govern-
ment controlling the territory must review. The third subsection re-
quires "a local agency," which by definition excludes the state, a
county, or a city, to submit its actions to the planning agency of the
city or county in which the action is to occur. All of these require-
ments apply only if the city or county has a general or partial plan.
It made some sense to construe CEQA's "all other local govern-
mental agencies" to mean special and school districts but not cities
and counties because that is how Section 65402 used the term "local
agency." Moreover, because of legislation passed a month before
CEQA, all cities and counties would have conservation elements in
their general plans by July 1, 1972.30 The ambiguity probably de-
layed city and county attentiveness to the demands of CEQA. At the
time, the state's deadline for planmaking seemed more threatening.
B. NEPA Influences Other States
In March and April of 1971, three states adopted NEPA-like acts.
Montana3 ' adopted NEPA almost verbatim. Like Puerto Rico, Mon-
tana's Act contained the ambiguity2 over the Act's application to
local government.33
29. § 9, U.S. Dept. of Commerce (rev. ed. 1926).
30. Ch. 717, § 3, [1970] Cal. Stats. 1345 (approved and filed Aug. 13, 1970)
required cities and counties to have conservation elements of general plans by July
1, 1972. The date has subsequently been changed to Dec. 31, 1973.
31. Montana Environmental Policy Act, MONT. RaV. CODEs ANN. §§ 69-6501
to 69-6517 (Supp. 1973).
32. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
33. Compare MONT. REV. CoDes ANN. § 69-6504(b) with § 69-6504(b)(6)
(Supp. 1973). Indiana has an identical provision; see note 77 infra.
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New Mexico 34 adopted a law which rearranged some of NEPA's
sections and left other matters out. But with some deletions, the
heart of the Act was that of NEPA § 102. Since the New Mexico Act
did not contain a provision instructing state agencies to give advice
to local governments, it is not clear whether the duties imposed in
New Mexico on "all agencies of the state"3 5 included local govern-
ments.
Washington 30 adopted a statute which, while influenced by NEPA,
is different from other state statutes. The statute applies only to
state highways which the Department of Highways determines will
significantly affect the quality of the human environment and to all
highways in new locations or requiring additional right of way. An
EIS is to be prepared on such projects prior to the first public hear-
ing relating to location or design. The report is to include matters
similar to those required by NEPA37
Once the highway department finishes its report, it is sent to the
director of the Department of Ecology, who determines whether the
project will have a significant environmental impact. If he concludes
it will, he prepares an "environmental review statement" which in-
cludes "a statement of any beneficial environmental impact or any
amenities either natural or human which may reasonably be expected
to occur as a result of the project." Prior to the Department of High-
way's public hearing, the environmental review statement is sent to
the Department, to interested persons, and to the press.38
Two features of the Washington statute therefore commend them-
selves for attention to other states. First, as with the California
statute, which requires that an EIR be sent to a planning agency for
review,39 the Washington EIS is sent to an ecology agency that has
broad responsibilities for "watchdogging" the environment. The de-
velopment agency is not its own judge. Indeed, the Washington
statute even goes further than the California statute and requires a
broader-view agency to determine significance and to prepare the
report. Secondly, while NEPA and most NEPA-like state acts create
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-20-1 to 12-20-7 (Supp. 1973).
35. Id. § 12-20-6.
36. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 47.04.110-47.04.130 (Supp. 1972).
37. Id. § 47.04.120.
38. Id. § 47.04.130.
39. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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the impression that the natural environment is good and that de-
%clopment is an evil to be tolerated only when necessary, the Wash-
ington statute seems to suggest that a highway could itself benefit the
natural or human environment.
Then in May of 1971, Washington adopted a virtually verbatim
NEPA-like statute 5 that expressly resolved the local government
enigma. Under the Washington statute, NEPA-like duties were im-
posed on "all branches of government of this state, including state
agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties."'4 1 In
strict loyalty to NEPA language, the Washington statute included all
"actions,""' and thus is arguably broader than the California law
which refers to state and local "projects."4 3
In June, rather than apply NEPA-like legislation to all actions or
to particular actions within the state, Delaware adopted legislation
applying to some actions within a limited part of the state-the coastal
zone." Requests for manufacturing permits must be referred to the
State Planning Office and must be accompanied by an EIS.45
Instead of passing legislation, Hawaii applied a NEPA-like require-
ment by executive order of the Governor. The order applied to pro-
posals for legislation and to any other major state actions or projects
utilizing state funds and/or state lands, and generally followed NEPA
§$ 102. 'e
Even a casual reading of the North Carolina Act,47 with an October
1971 effective date, indicates it was drafted with both NEPA and
CEQA as models. Like the California Act, the matters covered in the
North Carolina EIS include six, rather than NEPA's five,48 items.
The sixth item from CEQA includes "mitigation measures proposed
40. WASH. Rrv. CODr ANN. § 43.21C.010-43.21C.900 (Supp. 1972).
41. Id. § 43.21C.030(2).
42. Id. § 43.210.030(2)(c).
4W. See notes 16-28 and accompanying text supra. As will be made clear in the
discussion of the Friends of Mammoth case the California law was interpreted as if
it said "actions."
44. DaL. Coan ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-7013 (Supp. 1972).
45. Id. §§ 7004, 7005.
46. Exec. Order, April 23, 1971 (Hawaii), 2 102 MoNrroR 21 (Council on En-
vironmental Quality, May 1972).
,17. N.C. GLN. STAT. § 113A-1 to 113A-10 (Supp. 1971).
48. See note 17 supra.
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to minimize the impact.."4 9 State-permitted projects are not gen-
erally included; rather, the North Carolina Act requires a statement
by state agencies only "for legislation and actions involving expendi-
ture of public moneys for projects and programs." 50
Local agencies in North Carolina are not required to prepare en-
vironmental impact statements for their own activities, but cities,
counties and towns are authorized to require any special-purpose gov-
ernmental unit or private developer of a major development project
to furnish a statement.5 ' "Major developments" include shopping
centers, subdivisions and other housing developments, and industrial
and commercial projects, but exclude any project of less than two
contiguous acres in extent.52 A local government is to provide infor-
mation to a state agency which may be required to prepare an EIS
where programs, projects, and actions of local governmental units are
subject to review, approval, or licensing by state agencies.5 3
C. CEQA-The Controversy Begins to Ripen
During the last half of 1971, the stage was being set in California
for the showdown over CEQA in the coming year. In June, the Board
of Supervisors of Mono County affirmed the decision of its planning
commission to issue a conditional use permit for a small condominium,
and a building permit was subsequently issued. Lower courts refused
to intervene, and the Supreme Court of California was asked to issue
a stay since the developer in Mono County then had all the permis-
sion needed to begin development.54
During the last half of 1971, California state, regional, and local
agencies were also working on interim administrative procedures for
implementing CEQA with less than deliberate speed. The California
Resources Agency promulgated some interim guidelinesos that exer-
49. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 113A-4(2)(c) (Supp. 1971).
50. Id. § 113A-4(2).
51. Id. § 113A-8.
52. Id. § 113A-9(1).
53. Id. § 113A-9(3).
54. The facts in this paragraph are from the petition for the stay in Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, filed in the Supreme Court of the State of
California, Oct. 28, 1971.
55. Proposed Guidelines for the Preparation and Evaluation of Environmental
Impact Statements Under the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970
(1971).
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cised Evelle J. Younger, the California attorney general, who had a
strong environmental unit. Younger and some of his deputies, in a
formal petition addressed to no one in particular and filed by "at-
torneys for and on behalf of the People of the State of California,"5 7
picked up a word from Calvert Cliffs'58 and alleged that the proposed
guidelines were a "crabbed"' 9 interpretation of the CEQA require-
ments.
The attorney general complained that the proposed guidelines did
not cover local agencies", and that the policy statement in the guide-
lines indicated that environmental quality should be restored only
"to the fullest extent practicable.""1  The attorney general pointed
out that the statute contained no such limitation 62 and also alleged
that the guidelines read as if the long-term "protection of the en-
vironment" was a "guiding criterion." The attorney general said that
protection of the environment" was the "guiding criterion." 63
CEQA did not define the term "project."' 4 The proposed guide-
lines stated, "'Project' includes any major work segment involving
siting, land purchases, design, or construction activities, utilizing state
or federal funds carried out by any or all levels of government, which
could have a significant effect on the environment of the state."65
Pointing out that no statutory support existed for use of the adjective
'major" in CEQA, as distinguished from NEPA, and arguing that
the term "project" was equivalent to the term "actions" used in the
CEQ Interim Guidelines, 6 the attorney general proposed his own
definition of project:
56. Attorney General of the State of California, Petition, "In re Proposed Guide-
lines for the Preparation and Evaluation of Environmental Impact Statements Un-
der the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970," Sept. 3, 1971 [hereinafter
cited as Attorney General Petition].
57. Attorney General Petition 1.
58. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
59. Attorney General Petition 3. "We believe that the Commission's crabbed
interprutation of NEPA makes a mockery of the Act." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
60. Attorney General Petition 3.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Consider the description of CEQA with emphasis on use of term "project" in
notes 16-28 and accompanying text supra.
65. Attorney General Petition 9.
66. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment,
para. 5(a) (ii), 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
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Project includes activities:
(a) Directly undertaken by state or local governmental agen-
cies;
(b) Supported in whole or in part through state or local pub-
lic agency contracts, grants, subsidies, loans or other forms of
funding assistance;
(c) Involving a state or local governmental agency lease, per-
mit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use.67
The attorney general also complained that the Resource Agency's
proposed guidelines included "utilitarian" as well as "environmental"
goals without statutory warrant,8 that the guidelines were not loyal
to NEPA interpretations on retroactivity,60 and that the guidelines
exempted "routine" projects without statutory warrant.70 The attor-
ney general noted that environmentally-oriented state departments,
such as those dealing with fish and game, would likely be over-
whelmed by having to make comments on statements of larger, well-
funded departments dealing with public works and water resources.
He suggested that the guidelines enable the commenting agencies
to bill the development agencies and that the cost could then be
passed on to the projects, forcing them to absorb the environmental
costs imposed.71 To facilitate public input, the attorney general sug-
gested the guidelines should also contain provisions for a draft EIR
which would be published in a monthly publication to be circulated
to interested parties and upon which the public would have 90 days
to comment.7 2
The order of the Supreme Court of California agreeing to hear the
Mono County case and issuing a stay was the opening event in the
NEPA-like story in 1972.73 On February 2, 1972, a bill74 was intro-
67. Attorney General Petition 9. The attorney general thus concluded that state
and federal requirements were identical, except that "'Projects' does not include
recommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropriations and does not
include policy and procedure making." Id. at 20.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 21-22.
70. Id. at 22-23.
71. Id. at 26.
72. Id. at 29-30. In so suggesting, the attorney general indicated that these
recommended procedures were based on the 1971 CEQ guidelines (see note 7
supra) and on that agency's "102 Monitor" publication, which contains informa-
tion on EIS's that are being prepared by agencies.
73. The order taking jurisdiction was entered on Jan. 13, 1972. Brief for Appel-
lants at 3, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d
1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
74. Cal. A.B. 304, § 21151 (1972).
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duced in the legislature to require an EIS of all local governments
for projects they permitted. This bill gave some support to the argu-
ment of local governments that CEQA had not previously included
publicly-permitted private projects.
D. NEPA Influences More States, CEQA Controversy Ripens,
State Courts Begin to React
The California controversy may have come to the attention of In-
diana legislators, for the Indiana Act,75 while virtually verbatim
NEPA, does provide that an EIS is not required "for the issuance
of a license or permit by any agency of the state." 70 But the applica-
tion of the Act to local agency projects was not clear, for, as with
sev cral other states, the Act inscrutably applies to "all agencies of the
state." 77 The Indiana statute also usefully provides that "[a]ny state
agency that is required by the national environmental policy act to
file a federal environmental impact statement shall not be required
to file a statement with the state government . . . unless the action
(olitemplated requires state legislation or state appropriations." 78
In March, a bilSO which was ultimately to amend CEQA was in-
troduced in the California legislature by the principal author of the
original bill. But in April, the newsmaking on NEPA-like state acts
shifted to Wisconsin, which adopted a NEPA-like act. 0 The Wiscon-
sin Act applied to "all agencies of the state,"'8 thus leaving local
governments in limbo, but adopted the Council on Environmental
Quality guidelines as the Wisconsin guidelines8 2 Thus, publicly-
permitted private projects were assumedly included. Another pro-
vision was similar to a provision in the -Washington Act 3 dealing
75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-5301 to 35-5308 (Supp. 1973).
76. lId, 35-5306.
77. Id. § 35-5303(2). As with other state statutes, the Indiana statute might
sugest ]ocal agencies are excluded because IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-5303(2) (C) (f)
(Stipp. 1973), indicates that state agencies shall "make available to counties, muni-
uipalitics, institutions, and individuals, advice . . . ." The language is essentially
identical to MONT. tXv. CODES ANN. § 69-6504(b) (6) (Supp. 1973). See note 33
supra.
78. IN. A,N. ST AT. § 35-5308 (Supp. 1973).
79. Cal. A.B. 889 (1972).
8 . WIS. STAT. AN:. § 1.11 (Supp. 1973).
N1. Id. 1. 11 (2).
i 2. Id. §1. 11(2) (c).
83. S,,, notes 38-39 and accormpanying text supra.
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with highways: the EIS "shall also contain details of the beneficial
aspects of the proposed project, both short term and long term, and
the economic advantages of the proposal."8' 4 A Wisconsin provision
not found in NEPA and unique to the state statutes thus far con-
sidered was that "every proposal other than for legislation shall re-
ceive a public hearing before a final decision is made;" if a hearing
was otherwise required, the EIS hearing requirement was satisfied. 5
Effective April 29, 1972, Wisconsin also provided that its Department
of Natural Resources could require an environmental impact state-
ment of an applicant for any permit or Department approval if the
area affected exceeded 40 acres or the estimated cost of the project
exceeded $25,000.86
In Civic Improvement Committee v. Volpe,8 7 the first case to cite a
state NEPA-like statute, the Fourth Circuit, with one dissent, held
that a highway project had too little federal involvement to warrant
an injunction for failure to prepare an EIS under NEPA. But the
court noted that plaintiffs might wish to pursue their remedy under
the NEPA-like North Carolina statute.
Plaintiffs' first reported judicial success under a state NEPA-like
law occurred in July of 1972. In Keith v. Volpe,88 plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the Federal Highway Administration, under NEPA, and
the California Division of Highways, under CEQA, from continuing
a freeway project until an EIS and an EIR were provided. The pri-
mary issue in the case was whether or not the project was so far along
at the time of the effective date of the statutes as to excuse the high-
way funding and building agencies from preparing the statement
and the report. The issue has become a familiar one under NEPA,
and the federal court, as have many others applying NEPA, held that
the project was not so far along, even on September 18, 1970, the
effective date of CEQA, so as to excuse preparation of an EIS and an
84. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11(2)(c) (6) (Supp. 1973).
85. Id. § 1.11(2) (d). Of course, some guidelines require or encourage public
hearings. See, e.g., CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the
Environment, para. 10(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724, 7726 (1971); CEQA Guidelines,
provision discussed at note 232 and accompanying text inIra. Massachusetts has a
statutory public hearing requirement; see note 92 and accompanying text infra.
86. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1.11 (Supp. 1973).
87. 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972).
88. 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972). In a rehearing the court basically re-
affirmed its prior opinion, 4 ERC 1562 (1972).
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EIR. The court noted the similarity between NEPA and CEQA and
held that they should be interpreted in the same manner on the
retroactivity issue. The opinion constituted notice that, absent an
express difference in language, NEPA-like state acts would find cases
under NEPA being used as precedent. Later in July, a federal dis-
trict court, in Northside Tenants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe," cited
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 1.11 (2) .10 The case involved a challenge to a free-
way, and a preliminary injunction was issued on the basis of NEPA,
the court finding it unnecessary to consider the Wisconsin statute.
Also in July, Massachusetts enacted a law requiring that "all agen-
cies, departments, boards, commissions and authorities of the com-
monwealth shall review, evaluate, and determine the impact on the
natural environment of all works, projects or activities conducted
by them .. ."' The statute further directed that no commonwealth
agency "or any authority of any political subdivision thereof shall
commence any work, project, or activity which may cause damage to
the environment until sixty days after it has published a final en-
vironmental impact report . . . or until sixty days after a public
hearing on said report .... ."92 Research, planning, design, and other
preliminary work, however, could be undertaken. The statute would
seem to cover local agencies and might be intended to cover publicly-
permitted private activities. The report was to be disseminated to
"the originating agency, reviewing agencies, the appropriate regional
planning commission, the attorney general and the public."93 The
express mention of the attorney general was an interesting feature.
Among the California attorney general's complaints about the pre-
liminary California guidelines was that the Resources Agency had
not listed the attorney general as one to be consulted for comments. 9'
The attorney general pointed out that he had jurisdiction to bring
any action necessary to enforce any law, including CEQA.
In a feature likely motivated by reasons similar to those requiring
that reports on highways in Washington must be sent to the Director
of the Department of Ecology,'5 the Massachusetts statute provided
89. 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
90. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
91. MAss. GEN. LA-ws A-N. ch. 30, § 61 (1973).
92. Id. § 62.
93. Id.
94. Attorney General Petition 27.
95. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
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that the Secretary of Environmental Affairs must approve the selec-
tion of any consultant engaged to prepare the draft or final impact
report. Perhaps by the time the Massachusetts statute had passed,
notice had been taken of the explosion of EIS consulting firms in
California. Another Massachusetts provision was more like Wash-
ington's statute: "the secretary of environmental affairs.., shall issue
a written statement indicating whether . . . reports adequately and
properly comply with the provisions of this section."06 As with the
Wisconsin law, the Massachusetts Act used NEPA as a model97 to
guide state departments in promulgating their own rules and regula-
tions to carry out the purpose of the Massachusetts Act.08
These provisions give the impression that the Massachusetts law
was drafted with the experience of other states before the draftsmen.
So it is not surprising that the Massachusetts statute, the last statute
known to have been enacted as this article is being written, 09 looks
considerably different from NEPA. As final evidence of the borrow-
ing from other states, one might note that the suggestion by the Cali-
fornia attorney general00 that development agencies be authorized
to pay environmental agencies for expenses incurred in evaluating
the EIR is a feature of the Massachusetts law.101
The North Carolina Act, based on a state tradition that gives its
legislature one of the best research backups of any state in the coun-
try, had ordered the Governor to report to the Legislative Research
Commission on or before August 1, 1972, concerning the experience
under the Act and his recommendations.102 The Governor complied
and made several recommendations1 03
96. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30, § 62. Does such a provision mean less judi-
cial review? See note 112 and accompanying text infra.
97. As indicated at note 82 and accompanying text supra, Wisconsin actually uses
the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines as a referent.
98. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30, § 62 (1973).
99. See Connecticut Executive Order at note 138 and accompanying text infra.
See also the article's postscript for recent statutes.
100. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
101. MAss. GFN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30 § 62 (1973).
102. N.C. LAWS ch. 1203, § 11 (1971). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 (Supp.
1971).
103. Governor Robert W. Scott, A Report to the Legislative Research Commis-
sion on Experience with the Environmental Policy Act of 1971, with Recommenda-
tions for Refinement (July 1972) [hereinafter cited as Gov. Scott Report]. These
recommendations are now before the North Carolina Legislature, Letter from Roy
Paul, N.C. Office of State Planning, to Donald Hagman, March 20, 1973.
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Ie recommended that EIS's on proposed legislation be dropped,
i'oting that a similar provision in NEPA had been implemented only
superficially and that with over 2,000 bills introduced yearly in the
North Carolina legislature, the provision was hardly workable. But,
the Governor noted, the agencies and lawmakers should consider
environmental matters in making legislative proposals.104 He also
recommended that the EIS be prepared early in the planning process.
Noting that alternatives have usually been superficially stated and
their environmental impacts had not been dearly stated, he recom-
mended that legislation tightening this requirement be enacted.10 5
Citizen inputs should be sought early in the project rather than at
a late date; otherwise, citizen participation would more likely become
citizen opposition. 10-
In contrast to the "crabbed" interpretation of NEPA by federal
regulatory agencies concerning the need to prepare an EIS, 07 the
Governor observed that it is the programs with regulatory powers that
ha% e the most significant impact upon the environment. But rather
than require an EIS for each permit or license, the Governor recom-
mended that "programs [of regulatory agencies] should include in
their annual work programs a program plan which serves as an en-
viionmental impact analysis or guide explaining how decisions af-
fecting the environment will be made."'' s He also concluded that
the North Carolina Act should provide for the issuance of supple-
mentary guidelines and should be made permanent.109 Noting that
only one city had utilized its authority to require EIS's as of the time
of the report, the Governor recommended no changes until more ex-
perience had been accumulated." 0
On August 16, 1972, CEQA was amended to make it clear that the
"all other local governmental agencies" which were required to pre-
101. Gov. Scott Report 2, 8.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2.
107. See note 59 and accompanying text supra and notes 225-31 and accom-
panying text infra.
108. Gov. Scott Report 2.
109. The original North Carolina Act has a provision for its termination on Sept.
1, 1973. N.C. GN. STAT. § 113A-1 (Supp. 1971).
110. Gov. Scott Report 10.
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pare EIR's included special districts as well as cities and counties
without conservation elements.11
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dis-
trict 1 2 was the first reported case in a state court under a NEPA-like
state act. The case was important because it evidenced that state as
well as federal courts might interpret NEPA-like state acts in a tough
manner. The trial court had enjoined a water supply project until
the water district prepared an EIR to submit to the planning com-
mission as required by CEQA.113 The district furnished an EIR eight
days later. The planning commission concluded that it was "accept-
able" under CEQA and the trial court dissolved the injunction, rea-
soning that it was not the duty of the courts to consider the adequacy
or thoroughness of the EIR.
While federal courts had ruled that a court could review the ade-
quacy or thoroughness of an EIS, defendants on appeal argued that
CEQA and NEPA were different. Under CEQA, the special district
sent its EIR to a planning commission which reviewed the EIR for
adequacy.14 The California appellate court did not accept this argu-
ment, noting that the planning commission could only receive and
consider the report and make recommendations. It could not make
a decision that bound the district. Therefore, the planning com-
mission had no effective review of EIR adequacy; that duty remained
in the courts. But citing federal cases, the appellate court concluded
that it did not have the duty of passing on the validity of the con-
clusions expressed in the EIR but only on the sufficiency of the report
as an informative document. The court ordered the water district
to prepare a new EIR, discussing bona fide objections to its project
and reporting on the project's environmental impact as an integrated
whole.
E. Friends of Mammoth
National news was made on September 21, 1972, when the Supreme
Court of California decided Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Super-
111. CAL. Pun. RIs. CODE § 21062 (West Supp. 1972). See note 155 infra. For
the ambiguity concerning local agencies see also notes 28-30 and accompanying
text supra.
112. 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
113. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 1970). See note 28 and accompany-
ing text supra.
114. Id. Compare the Massachusetts provision discussed in text at note 96 supra.
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visors.11 An attorney for the Center for Law in the Public Interest,
which became an amicus in Friends, stated:
The Court's decision to hear . . . Friends struck the environ-
mental law world like a thunderbolt. The case clearly did not
represent the best kind of test case .... On a relative scale, the
project involved could only be described as quite small [a 184-
unit condominium] . .. the condominium in question was to be
erected directly across the street from an even larger condomin-
ium. The amount of public expenditures... was ... tiny. And,
since the governmental permit was issued by a local, rather than
a state, body, the case was more difficult because of various quirks
in the wording of the statute.
But the high court's dramatic action of reaching down to as-
sume jurisdiction... hinted that the Court was anxious to hear
the matter ....
We decided . . . to enter . . . hoping at best to get a strong
favorable ruling, and at worst to minimize any unfortunate dicta
that might result from the Court's considering one of the hardest,
rather than the easiest, cases under the EQA first.11
Of course, the California attorney general had always believed that
publicly-permitted private projects were covered by CEQA, and it
was not surprising that the attorney general's unit charged with pro-
tecting the environment joined plaintiffs as amicus.
The principal legal question posed by the court was whether CEQA
applies to private activities for which a permit or other similar en-
titlement is required. Since defendant Mono County did not have a
conservation element of a general plan, the court indicated that the
determination turned on whether the term "project" as used in §
21151117 included private activity for which a government permit was
necessary. Since the word "project" was not defined in the Act, the
court searched for some intent. In '"Test's CAL. PUB. REs. CoDE ANN.
§ 21000 (g), the court found the following language:
It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state
government which regulate activities of private individuals, cor-
porations, and public agencies which are found to affect the
115. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
116. Address by Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., of the Center for Law in the Public In-
terest to the Victor Gruen Foundation for Environmental Planning Symposium:
The Environmental Impact Statement and What It Means to You, Dec. 1, 1972.
117. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
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quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that
major consideration is given to preventing environmental dam-
age."8s
The court also had before it a declaration of Assemblyman John
Knox, the author of the Bill, that he intended to cover publicly-per-
mitted private projects. On the other hand, defendants had secured
Assemblyman Porter's declaration that such permits were not covered.
Porter was also an author of CEQA. The consultant"19 to the assem-
bly committee which had developed CEQA had testified before a
U.S. Senate Committee that publicly-permitted private activities were
not covered by CEQA. 20 The legislative counsel1 2' and the state
agency charged with drafting guidelines concluded that CEQA did
not cover such activities.
Faced with this evidence of intent, the court opined on the weak-
ness of the evidence, declared itself as believing the legislature was
serious about improving the environment, and held that the term
"project" included publicly-permitted private projects. So the hold-
ing was dictum on state-permitted private projects' 22
But did CEQA apply to locally-permitted private projects, which
was the dispute in the Friends case? While the court did not men-
tion it, there might have been some difficulty in stretching the policy
statement of § 21000 (g) to cover local governments because § 21000-
(g) refers to "all agencies of the state government." 23 But defend-
ants thought they had a better argument. Section 21151 of the Act,
the section crucial to the decision, provided that CEQA applies to a
"'project' ... 'they [i.e., local governmental agencies] intend to carry
out.' "124
The court first noted that intent can sometimes prevail over the
letter of an act. The court next noted the similarity of CEQA to
NEPA and that the legislature must have known of the guidelines
118. 8 Cal. 3d at 256, 502 P.2d at 1054, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (emphasis added
by the court).
119. In the California legislature, a "consultant" is the title for the head of
the staff of a committee.
120. 8 Cal. 3d at 258, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
121. The legislative counsel is the attorney for the California legislature, giving
opinions to the legislators and drafting bills.
122. 8 Cal. 3d at 258, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
123. See note 118 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the ambi-
guity of other state statutes, see notes 14, 33, 35, 37 and accompanying text supra.
124. 8 Cal. 3d at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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issued under NEPA four months before passage of CEQA. The guide-
lines included actions, such as projects, involving a federal lease, per-
mit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use. The court thus
concluded that defendant county should have considered whether
the condominium project may have a significant effect on the environ-
ment and, if so, should have prepared an EIR before issuing a con-
ditional use or building permit.
[T]he granting or denying of a permit is an act which a govern-
mental authority "carries out." Accordingly, we construe the
phrase following "project" to mean only that before an environ-
mental impact report becomes required the government must
have some minimal link with the activity, either by direct pro-
prietary interest or by permitting, regulating, or funding private
activity.-'5
To bolster its conclusion, the court rejected an argument that the
traditional conditional use permit process under zoning took into
account environmental impacts. The court did not believe the
traditional system, at least as applied in this case, evidenced an in-
quiry into environmental impacts nearly as rigorous as required by
CEQA. Moreover, the court indicated that to exempt private activi-
ties would lead to ruination of the environment, especially in sparsely
populated Mono County where there was little in the way of public
works. Additionally, Mono County had significant amounts of na-
tural resources and wildlife in need of protection. In making these
policy determinations, the court observed that to leave out publicly-
permitted private projects would be incongruous and paradoxical.
Defendants sought to persuade the court that amendments to CEQA
from its first introduction as a bill, when it covered "programs," to its
final version covering "projects,"' 21 was a narrowing of intent. But
the court read the change as evidencing an intent by the legislature
to leave out matters of general planning, policy, and procedure mak-
ing. The court believed the statute picked up the term "project"
because that term was used in the federal guidelines.
Defendants next argued that since CEQA directed that the EIR
accompany the public projects report required to be delivered to a
planning agency by California Government Code § 65402,127 CEQA
125. Id. at 262, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
126. See note 16 and accompanying text upra.
127. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
was limited to public works projects and did not cover publidy-per-
mitted private projects. The court concluded that CEQA's purpose
cannot be frustrated by procedural details surrounding the filing of
reports. If public works projects are involved, § 65402 reports and
an EIR must be delivered to the planning agency; if publicly-per-
mitted private projects are involved, the planning agency must still
receive the EIR.
The court indicated in footnote 10 that it was not holding that
an EIR was actually required in the Friends case because the pri-
vately-permitted project might have no significant effect on the en-
vironment. But the footnote continued:
[T]he term "significant effect" may not be used lightly as a basis
on which to excuse the making of impact reports. Instead, the
term must be interpreted broadly to include those activities
which have any nontrivial effect on the environment. It seems
clear that the project herein involved will indeed have such effect
.... [U]nder the act a governmental entity is only required to
find that the project may have a significant effect .... 128
F. Reactions to Friends, Another State Act,
Environmentalists Win Other Major Suits
Two years and four days after its passage, CEQA had teeth. Neu-
tral 129 observers described the Friends decision as "ridiculous"1'' and
as the worst misconstruction of language by the Supreme Court of
California since 1967,131 thereby tending to agree with the dissenting
opinion which indicated that the majority had distorted the plain
meaning of common English words.
The reaction of local government officials was virtually one of de-
spair, particularly since few local governments had even implemented
128. 8 Cal. 3d 1, -, 500 P.2d 1360, 1376, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16, 32 (1972) (first
emphasis added, second emphasis by court). Footnote 10 was deleted in the court's
final opinion. See note 151 and accompanying text infra.
129. That is, those who are neither "gung-ho" environmentalists nor strong apol-
ogists for the local governments.
130. Interview with E. Rabin, Professor of Law, University of California at
Davis, a specialist on land use controls.
131. Conversation with Kenneth Ehrman, attorney at law, author (with S.
Flavin) of TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY (1967). "What do you think of the
Friends decision?" Ehrman: "It reminds me of Sacramento County v. Hickman."
[66 Cal. 2d 841, 428 P.2d 593, 59 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1967), in which the court held
that the constitutional term "full cash value" in property tax assessment could
mean 251% of full cash value].
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CEQA as to their own public works projects by the date of the de-
cision. The City of Los Angeles held up issuance of permits for
projects costing more than $1 million, and grading permits were frozen
for five or more lot subdivisions. Los Angeles County held up per-
mits for construction of all kinds1 2
Richard Carpenter, Executive Director of the League of California
Cities, said, "I can't think of any other decision that will have a more
far-reaching effect on the operation of cities .... "133 Pointing out
that 45,000 building permits were issued in Los Angeles last year,
Carpenter said it would be "physically impossible" for most cities
to process the EIR's. T- The city of Walnut Creek, California stopped
issuing building permits "except for such trivial projects as swim-
ming pools."''a3 All new construction in Santa Barbara County was
halted. A spokesman for the State Chamber of Commerce said, "I
think labor is going to be up in arms about this. It will mean a loss
of jobs."' : ,
Ten days after Friends, the Los Angeles city attorney issued an
opinion indicating the decision applied to conditional uses, build-
ing permits, leases, community redevelopment projects, grading per-
mits, connection permits, variances, subdivisions, franchises, sewer
connection permits, supplemental use districts, drill sites within oil
drilling districts, and zone changes. When permits were issued, a
disclaimer was attached indicating that they might later be revoked.
Such a practice seemed highly questionable on discretionary permits,
but technically no authority existed to deny a building permit if it
complied with existing ordinances. The city attorney recommended
that the City Building Code be amended to authorize denial.137
Meanwhile, on the East Coast, the Governor of Connecticut ordered
state bodies (impliedly excluding local governments) to prepare
evaluations, including an analysis of short versus long-term costs and
benefits, of projects directly undertaken by state bodies or funded in
132. Santa Monica Evening Outlook, Sept. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
133. Fradkin, Court Ruling on Ecology Reports on Private Projects Stirs Con-
fusion, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 1, 1972, § C, at 8, col. 1.
134. Id.
135. Id. col. 2.
136. Id. cols. 2 & 3.
137. Reibscheid, City Attorney Sets Council Guidelines After 'Mammoth', Los
Angeles Daily Journal, Oct. 5, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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whole or in part by the state.1 38 If environmental statements were
required by federal or other state laws, the evaluations covered by
the order did not have to be made, but the statements would be con-
sidered and reviewed as the order provided. State environmental
agencies would comment on and review the evaluations and state-
ments and then forward them to the State Planning Council which
makes recommendations to the Governor.
Two days after his colleague in Connecticut issued the rather mild
NEPA-like order, California's Governor Reagan held an emergency
session of his cabinet. He asked the attorney general to seek modifi-
cation of the Friends decision so that it could not be applied retro-
actively to permits issued before the decision. Legal officials from
cities and counties throughout California "jammed" a meeting spon-
sored by the California District Attorneys and County Counsels As-
sociation to sort out the effects of the ruling, many indicating they
would seek to limit retroactivity. Others announced a decision to
seek a moratorium on compliance with the Act until procedures
could be worked out. Meanwhile, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose,
and Santa Cruz ordered moratoriums on the issuance of building
permits.2
39
On October 10, 1972, the attorney general announced he would
seek a modification of the ruling to limit its retroactivity. He indi-
cated he might also ask the court to authorize a moratorium of sev-
eral months to work out procedures. But he noted that legislation
would still be necessary. He indicated that one question to be re-
solved was whether the government or the developer should pay the
cost of the EIR. He said another issue was whether a negative EIR
should preclude a local government from approving a project. 140
Of course, there were some, including local government officials,
who applauded the decision, and there was a good deal of over-
reaction. For one, there simply was not enough legal manpower
around to challenge all wrongfully issued permits. Ninety-nine out
of a hundred projects would get through for that reason alone. But
on October 19, 1972, potential legal manpower was supplied.
In La Raza Unida v. Volpe,'41 a federal district court in California
138. Exec. Order No. 16, Oct. 14, 1972 (Conn.).
139. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 7, 1972, pt. 2, at 1, col. 5.
140. Lembke, Younger Will Seek Exclusions from Ecology Impact Reports, Los
Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
141. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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decided that J. Anthony Kline, of San Francisco-based Public Advo-
cates, Inc., was entitled to attorneys' fees and expert witness fees for
successfully enjoining a freeway. The court's rationale in this "un-
precedented ruling" ' was that the suit helped effectuate a strong
congressional policy, benefited numerous persons interested in en-
vironmental preservation, and that private parties should not be
discouraged by economic burdens from bringing such actions against
public agencies. While La Raza Unida was not a NEPA suit, its
application to other environmental lawsuits might suggest the attrac-
tion of a good deal of legal talent to attack environmental degrading
actions by governmental agencies.
A few days later, Friends could have been used by the federal dis-
trict court as precedent for its ruling in McLean Gardens v. National
Capital Planning Commission (NCPC).143 The NCPC "may make a
report and recommendation to the Zoning Commission of the Dis-
trict of Columbia on proposed amendments of the zoning... maps,"'' 44
and when asked to approve site plans for a large-scale planned de-
velopment, the Zoning Commission "shall submit the application...
to the [NCPC] for review and report."'4 5 It was clear that the NCPC
had power only to recommend and not to deny. But the court con-
cluded that the NCPC's role was a major federal action and that the
3,000-person planned unit development proposed for McLean Gar-
dens would have a significant impact on the environment. The court
therefore ordered an injunction pending preparation of an EIS by
the NCPC.
The result in McLean Gardens is not surprising because NEPA
clearly covers publicly-permitted private projects. 40 The decision is
142. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 23, 1972, pt. 2, at 2, col. 1.
143. 4 ERC 1708 (D.D.C. 1972).
144. 40 U.S.C. § 71g(a) (1970). While the court cites this provision with
respect to large-scale planned development, a review of the Zoning Regulations of
the District of Columbia suggests approval of such development may not actually
involve an amendment.
145. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 7501.4 (Supp. V. 1972).
146. Compare Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The NCPC had adopted a plan calling for low density and park development along
the waterfront in Georgetowna. A study to implement the plan had been under-
taken. But owners announced plans to build commercial developments which
would be permitted by the existing zoning. The Commission froze development for
a time pending a hearing to consider adoption of a two-year moratorium for corn-
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in accord with Friends and reinforces the practice that the EIR
should be prepared by (or under the direction of) the planning
commission and should accompany the commission's traditional re-
port to the decision-makers who actually approve the development.
While California attorneys were preparing to seek modification of
the Friends decision, the Washington (State) Court of Appeals 47
decided that the state's NEPA-like highway law'14 did not apply to
a highway for which no public hearings were scheduled after August
9, 1971, an operative date contained in the statute. A dissenting
opinion stated that since Washington's more general NEPA-like law 40
took effect prior to the trial, that law should be applied to the high-
way acquisition for which landowners were demanding an EIS.
On November 3, 1972, some 25 months after CEQA's enactment,
environmentalists represented by the Planning and Conservation
League with the backing of builders and construction workers groups
filed a petition with the Supreme Court of California. That they
cooperated was unique enough, but their lawsuit was even more
unique-a demand that the court order the state to develop guide-
lines.150 The fact that it took the CEQ only four months to develop
interim guidelines for NEPA said much about the state agency's
relative enthusiasm for CEQA.
Then on November 6, 1972, the Supreme Court of California modi-
pletion of the implementation study. After the hearing, the Commission rejected
the moratorium proposal.
Without citation of authority, the court states that NEPA requirements for an
EIS "do not apparently apply to actions of the District of Columbia Government
unless federal financial assistance is involved in individual District projects." Id.
at 410. But citing NCPC, Guidelines for the Protection and Enhancement of En-
vironmental Quality in the National Capitol Region, Aug. 6, 1972, 1 ELR 46034,
the court indicates that "[w]here ... the potential environmental effects of the
Commission's decision are substantial, it must at least consider the environmental
issue to fulfill its public interest mandate." Id.
While the court appears to be saying that D.C. agencies issuing permits do not
have to complete an EIS, it is hard to distinguish McLean Gardens. One distinc-
tion might be that the NCPC is not a D.C. agency; it is the planning commission
for D.C., but its jurisdiction is broader. Another possible distinction is that the
non-action (failure to change the zoning) was a non-action. No permit issuance
was involved.
147. State v. Burch, 4 ERC 1718 (1972).
148. See notes 36-39 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
150. Dreyfuss, Environmentalists File Suit on Impact Reports, Los Angeles
Times, Nov. 3, 1972, pt. 2, at 1, col. 5.
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fled its Friends opinion by deleting footnote 10,151 which had so
frightened local government officials, and by adding several points
to the opinion. Its addition indicated that a common sense approach
should be utilized and that, ordinarily, the construction, improve-
ment, or operation of an individual dwelling or a small business
would not require an EIR. But the court declined to apply its de-
cision only prospectively. The court noted that most developments
would not require an EIR and that many permits issued after CEQA
and before Friends were secure because of statutes of limitations or
laches. For the same reasons, and because the court presumed "that
governmental agencies charged with responsibilities under the act
have been performing their duties [during the past 22 months] . ..
and can now draw upon their planning and experience in the public
sector to aid in solving whatever problems they may have in the
private sector," 1152 the court refused to stay the effective date of its
order. Moreover, the court opined, delay in development was implicit
in the legislature's decision to require EIR's. Of course, the court
well knew that local governments had been dragging their feet on
implementing EIR's for their own projects.
G. CEQA Is Amended
Those less than environmental purists having essentially no fur-
tier judicial route turned to the legislature. The California legis-
lature convened on November 8, 1972. It was scheduled to adjourn
on December 1. Two bills amending CEQA were before the legis-
lature, both being amended versions of bills introduced in February 1 - 3
and March.-I Assemblyman John Knox, the principal author of
CEQA, introduced a bill that undercut CEQA more than the other
bills.
On December 22, 1972, over 27 months after CEQA was enacted,
the California Resources Agency finally sent out draft guidelines for
environmental impact reports. Given the legislative efforts, it was a
shot in the dark. For on December 1, 1972, the Knox bill was signed
151. See note 128 and accompanying text supra. The citations to the Friends
opinion in this article are to the modified opinion.
152. 8 Cal. 3d at 273, 502 P.2d at 1066, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 778.
153. See note 74 supra.
154. See note 79 supra.
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by the Governor, effective four days later. It stated its intent only
"to declare and clarify existing law."'15
The first NEPA-like act adopted by a state became the first NEPA-
like act to be amended. Neither side was happy with the revisions,
thereby suggesting that it was a rather good compromise. It was also
a good test of the power of the environmentalists versus the power
of the developers in a state whose people, coming from every part of
the country, are as representative of America as any. The amended
CEQA passed after the expenditure of hundreds of thousands, if not
millions, of man-hours by the decision-makers, lobbyists, and lobby-
ists' clients. What, then, did this titanic struggle, made by informed,
skilled, and resource-backed persons, produce? What does it suggest
as a primogeniture for other NEPA-like state acts? What does it
suggest for NEPA, if NEPA should ever become embroiled in an
amendment fight?
As amended, CEQA is a much longer and complex act. It con-
tinues to cover "activities involving the issuance to a person of a
lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use."15 0
The Act applies to "discretionary projects ... including . . . enact-
ment and amendment of zoning ordinances, the issuance of zoning
variances, the issuance of conditional use permits and the approval
of tentative subdivision maps.."1 5 7 The Act does not apply to "min-
isterial projects."'' 58 All public agencies are to develop guidelines
consistent with those adopted by the Secretary of the Resources
Agency.150 The guidelines are to include criteria to determine when
a project does not have a significant effect on the environment. 100
Emergency repairs to public service facilities are exempt. 16 The
legislature defines significant effect projects as follows:
(a) A proposed project has the potential to degrade the quality
of the environment, curtail the range of the environment,
or to achieve short-term, to the disadvantage of long-term,
environmental goals;
155. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21060 (West Supp. 1972).
156. Id. § 21065(c) (West Supp. 1972).
157. Id. § 21080(a).
158. Id. § 21080(b). For this decision's significance, see notes 207-08, 214-15
and accompanying text infra.
159. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21082 (West Supp. 1972).
160. Id. § 21084.
161. Id. § 21085.
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(b) The possible effects of a project are individually limited
but cumulatively considerable;
(c) The environmental effects of a project will cause substantial
adverse effects on human beings, either directly or indi-
rectly.' -
But environment is narrowly defined to include "the physical condi-
tions which exist within the area which will be affected by a proposed
project.",'- A federal EIS can be submitted as an EIR if the EIS
covers all matters required of an EIR.04 The legislation provides
for publication of documents, like the "102 Monitor,"'1 5 which will
contain guideline revisions and announcements of completed EIR's.:6
Public agencies may charge fees for the preparation of an EIR. 67 A
multifaceted project with public and private activities undertaken
pursuant to a redevelopment plan is considered a single project re-
quiring a single EIR.1-s An additional item added to the matters
an ElR should cover is "[t]he growth-inducing impact of the proposed
action."'" An environmental impact report is defined as "an infor-
inational document."'' 70
Projects involving only planning were not covered in CEQA as
initially enacted; amendments also exempted "a project involving
only feasibility ... studies."'1' But the statute warned that planning
and feasibility studies "shall nevertheless include consideration of
environmental factors."172
In addition to consulting with governmental agencies, state agencies
are authorized to consult with "any person who has special expertise
with respect to any environmental impact involved."' 73 Another sec-
162. Id. § 21083.
163. Id. § 21060.5.
164. Id. § 21083.5.
165. For the California attorney general's recommendation see note 72 and
accompanying text supra.
166. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21088 (West Supp. 1972).
167. Id. § 21089. This was also a recommendation of the California attorney
general.
168. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21090 (West Supp. 1972).
169. Id. § 21100(g). For the other six matters to be covered in an EIR see
note 17 supra.
170. CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE § 21061 (West Supp. 1972).
171. Id. § 21102.
172. Id. § 21102. Section 21150 was also amended to exclude feasibility as
well as planning studies. See note 27 supra.
173, CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21104 (West Supp. 1972).
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tion was amended to require that an EIR be filed "with the appro-
priate local planning agency of any city or county." 17 4 When a gov-
ernmental entity is required to furnish a planning report,'7 5 the EIR
may be a part of that report.176
Essentially, local agencies are directed to comply with the Act
in the same manner as state agencies. The provision exempting
local agencies that had conservation elements of general plans was
dropped."'7 If the state orders a local agency to carry out a project,
then any EIR prepared is "to be limited to consideration of those
factors and alternatives which will not conflict with such order."178
Local agencies approving projects can require the proposer to prepare
an EIR or to submit information necessary to determine significant
effect.3 9
A long subchapter entitled "limitations" includes an amendment
that provides a means for resolving which agency is to be the lead
agency in preparing an EIR if more than one has competency. 80 No
EIR is required if a project changes, unless there are "substantial"
changes or the circumstances under which the project is being under-
taken substantially change."8" If an agency fails to make a determina-
tion of significant effect on the environment, its decision to carry out
or approve the project can be attacked within 180 days.' 8 ' If a de-
termination is alleged to be erroneous, attackers have 30 days to
challenge.' 83 "In any such action, the court shall not exercise its inde-
pendent judgment on the evidence but shall only determine whether
the act or decision is supported by substantial evidence ....",84
The selection of this standard for review is of obvious moment
compared to a court's alternatives of de novo review or considering
any supporting evidence. The Public Utilities Commission, a very
powerful agency that is constitutionally based in California, is treated
174. d. § 21105.
175. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
176. CAL. PUB. Rns. CODE § 21151 (West Supp. 1972).
177. The provision is reproduced in text at note 28 supra.
178. CAL. PUB. Rxs. CODE § 21154 (West Supp. 1972).
179. Id. § 21160.
180. Id. § 21165.
181. Id. § 21166.
182. Id. § 21167.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 21168.
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deferentially by the provision that a writ of mandate against it can
come only from the Supreme Court of California.-5
The developer-builder-local government coalition scored with a
provision that validates all permits issued on or before the effective
date of the amendments unless the validity of the permits had already
been adjudicated or actions had been filed. Even if actions had been
filed, permits are validated if substantial construction has occurred
and substantial liabilities have been incurred.186
The same interest group also persuaded the legislature to enact a
moratorium on publicly-permitted private projects. The new Act
does not apply to such projects until the 121st day after its effective
date, except for those projects that had been or were being litigated.
But in the interim, a public agency was not prohibited "from con-
sidering environmental factors in connection with the approval or
disapproval of a project and from imposing reasonable fees."'187 CEQA
does not apply to public agencies involved in disaster relief. 88 Fin-
ally, some doubt having been raised, the statute makes it clear that
CEQA is not a limitation or restriction on other powers of agencies
and, specifically, if inconsistent with the California Coastal Zone
Conservation Act of 1972, that Act would prevail 8 9
The day after CEQA as amended became effective, a federal district
court enjoined a highway until a federal EIS and state EIR were
prepared.' 00
H. Reactions to CEQA Amendments
With the legislature now adjourned, the Resources Agency went
back to work on the guidelines, those unhappy with the legislation
conducted a post-mortem, and builders stood in line to secure build-
ing permits during the moratorium.
183. Id. § 21168.6.
186. Id. §§ 21169-21170. These statutes are discussed in San Francisco Plan
& Urban Renew.sal Ass'n v. Central Permit Bureau, 30 Cal. App. 3d 920, 106
Cal. Rptr. 670 (1973). Because of these amendments, the court held that no
EIR was required for a permit issued prior to the effective date of the statutes.
187. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21171 (West Supp. 1972). Compare the experi-
ence in North Carolina where local governments have discretion to apply EIS's.
See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
188. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21172 (West Supp. 1972).
189. Id. § 21174. The Coastal Act is in CAL. Pun. RES. CODE § 27000 et seq.
(West Supp. 1972).
190. Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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The post-mortem suggested that the amendments, "hammered out
on the back of envelopes and cocktail napkins ... in order to hold
off chaos,"' 91 contained many ambiguities and inconsistencies. The
bill was called "a collection of trade-offs, a bone for the bankers in
one section that is balanced by goodies for the Planning and Conser-
vation League in another."'1 2 Many of the trade-offs were self-evi-
dent. But the discretionary-ministerial' 9 3 distinction needed some
explanation. The intent was to resolve the environmental issue early,
"such as when a developer applies for zoning, rather than late in the
game when he brings in his final tract map."' 94
The environmentalists explained that they sought to rid CEQA
of the conservation element provision because many such elements
"took up half a page... they were perfunctory and meant that proj-
ects would have just been rubber-stamped."'19 Definitions of words
like "environment," "project" and "significant effect" were alleged
to be "either weak or absent."'1 6 The definition of environment as
"physical" meant that CEQA did not "extend to socio-economic fac-
tors, such as a project's impact on schools ."17 The Friends of
Mammoth attorney complained:
I was trying [a] . .. case .... I made my usual point that the
principal value of an EIR to a growing community is that it
would contain a cost-benefit analysis. . . . [Seven minutes after
the Governor signed the bill] . . . my opposing counsel handed
the judge a copy of the bill and called his attention to § 21060.5
which defines "environment" .... The judge.., said he would
not regard an EIR as inadequate that did not include . . . eco-
nomic data. The absence of such information in an EIR on a
project in a growing community renders the report practically
useless in my judgment.198
But perhaps the amendment dealing with growth-inducing impacts
was a partial victory for the environmentalists.
191. Pryor, Clarification of State's Environmental Policy Due, Los Angeles
Times, Dec. 25, 1972, pt. 1, at 3, col. 5.
192. Id.
193. See notes 157-58 and accompanying text supra.
194. See Pryor, supra note 191.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Letter from John C. McCarthy to Assemblyman John Knox, Dec. 6, 1972.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/2
NEPA EFFECTS
One commentator felt that the inclusion of projects that are in-
dividually limited but cumulatively considerable could cover every
new single-family dwelling.199 Reacting to the provision about proj-
ects that "will cause substantial adverse effects on human beings,"
one attorney asked, " "What the hell does that mean?' . . . . He said
he asked Assemblyman Knox and didn't get an answer."200 The fact
that an EIR is defined as an informational document does not answer
the question of "what would happen if an EIR predicted dire conse-
quences from a project but was ignored."20' 1
The effect on building permit issuance was confusing. Since Oc-
tober, builders had been applying for permits anticipating a mora-
torium. Applications continued at a heavy rate after CEQA was
amended, but when the permits were taken to lending institutions,
builders found the lending institutions still wary. Until more clari-
fication, one banker reported "California is Deadsville, U.S.A., in
the financial community.2 02 While in October building permits
were being issued at near record levels statewide, by February 1973,
the evidence was mixed. In February 1973, still within the mora-
torium period, the City of Los Angeles issued $93 million worth of
permits, down from $142 million the previous February. Permits for
Los Angeles County for the second of the same two periods were up
about 50% in total amount. In the City of San Diego, the dollar
value of permits issued was down to about 20% of the previous
February.' °  If California homebuilders were really concerned about
CEQA dampening housing construction, however, their sales fore-
casts did not reflect the concern.2 04
I. CEQA Guidelines
On December 22, 1972, twenty-seven months after directed to do
,o. the Resources Agency mailed out interim guidelines for comment.
Twenty-eight and one-half months after CEQA passed, the guide-
199. See Pryor, supra note 191.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Jones, Stampede for Building Permits Hits Roadblock, Los Angeles Times,
Dec. 14, 1972, pt. 1, at 3, col. 5.
203. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 25, 1973, pt. X, at 21, col. 1.
204. Turpin, Southland Homebuilders Forecast 37.5% Increase in '73 Sales, Los
Angeles Times, Apr. 1, 1973, pt. X, at 1, col. 4.
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lines were final.20 5 A covering letter explained that the guidelines
did not limit matters to physical effects because of CEQA's language
on adverse effects on human beings and on growth-inducing impact.
On the effect of an EIR, the Agency declared:
An EIR may not be used as an instrument to rationalize approval
of a project, nor do indications of adverse impact, as enunciated
in an EIR, require that a project be disapproved-public agencies
retain existing authority to balance environmental objectives
with economic and social objectives. 206
A definition of a discretionary project was included:
[A]n activity defined as a project which requires the exercise of
judgment, deliberation, or decision on the part of the public
agency or body in the process of approving or disapproving a
particular activity, as distinguished from situations where the
public agency or body merely has to determine whether there has
been conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, or regula-
tions.207
That, of course, was to be distinguished from a ministerial project:
[T]hose activities defined as projects which are undertaken or
approved by a governmental decision which a public officer or
public agency makes upon a given state of facts in a prescribed
manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority. With
these projects, the officer or agency must act upon the given facts
without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the
propriety or wisdom of the act although the statute, ordinance,
or regulation may require, in some degree, a construction of its
language by the officer.208
The term "project" is defined as not including "[tlhe submittal of
proposals to a vote of the people of the State or of a particular com-
munity."20 9 There is no specific basis for the exemption in the statute.
Perhaps it was thought that when the people act directly, there is no
practical way to require them to prepare an EIR. Perhaps it was
thought that the people would always be acting by initiative or
referendum and, since proposals for legislation are not covered by
205. Resources Agency of California, Guidelines for Implementation of the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act of 1970, Feb. 5, 1973. 14 CAL. ADnA. Co n §
15000 et seq. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines].
206. Id. § 15012.
207. Id. § 15024.
208. Id. § 15032.
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CEQA as they are in NEPA, that when the people propose to legis-
late, no EIR is required. On the other hand, one could argue that
some legislative acts are covered by CEQA, for example, the enact-
ment and amendment of zoning ordinances. The people can enact
and amend zoning ordinances, sometimes by initiative,210 and usually
by referendum. Since an ordinance is always of some public agency,
it would make sense to impose upon the local government the duty
of preparing an EIR on a proposal to be submitted to the people so
that the people would be better informed. If the people are to vote
on a bond issue for a large-scale project proposed by the state, such
as a water project, the guidelines will hopefully not be construed in
a way that would make the preparation of an EIR unnecessary.
The guidelines express the pious hope that "[t]he requirement for
the preparation of an EIR should not cause undue delays in the
processing of applications for permits or other entitlements to use." 2 11
The guidelines do not define a "substantial change" in the project,
which would require a new EIR, but do give an example, namely,
"a change in the proposed location of the project.""'2 The guidelines
make it clear that the EIR's on multiple and phased projects should
be addressed to the ultimate or larger project rather than to the sub-
parts of the project.2' 3
Since each public agency is to develop its own guidelines, the Re-
sources Agency guidelines indicate that each public agency should
determine which of its actions are ministerial. But in the absence of
any discretionary provision contained in a local ordinance, the issu-
ance of building permits and business licenses, and the approval of
final subdivision maps, individual utility service connections and
disconnections are presumed ministerial".-1
More and more cities and counties in California are using the
issuance of a building permit as a last, discretionay look at a project
209. Id. § 15037(b) (4).
210. Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972). See
generally D. HAGMAN, C. MARTIN & J. LARSON, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE §§
4.1-4.7 (1969, Supp. 1973).
211. Guidelines § 15054.
212. Id. § 15067(b).
213. Id. § 15069.
214. Id. § 15073.
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to determine whether it is desirable.2 15 Building permits are rapidly
becoming an ad hoc land-use control device in California; indeed,
the Friends of Mammoth case involved a building permit. Thus such
permits may be more discretionary than the guidelines suggest. Final
subdivision map approval is rather ministerial because of a statutory
provision: "A governing body shall not deny approval of a final sub-
division map . . .if it has previously approved a tentative map . . .
and if it finds that the final map is in substantial compliance with the
previously approved tentative map." 216 Individual utility service con-
nections and disconnections would generally not seem to require an
EIR in any event because of an absence of significant effect, though
perhaps the ministerial nature of the action is necessary to avoid com-
pliance on the ground that the "effects of a project are individually
limited but cumulatively considerable." 217
In determining significant effect, the guidelines indicate that both
primary and secondary consequences should be included:
Primary consequences are immediately related to the project
(the construction of a new treatment plan may facilitate popu-
lation growth in a particular area), while secondary consequences
are related more to primary consequences than to the project
itself (an impact upon the resource base, including land, air,
water and energy use of the area in question may result from the
population growth) .218
That guideline is either unintelligible, confuses primary with second-
ary effects, or includes tertiary effects. It may well be that man's
language is not capable of anything better.
Examples of consequences which may have a significant effect on
the environment include those where a project "is in conflict with
environmental plans and goals that have been adopted by the com-
munity where the project is to be located."210 Does that mean that
projects should accord with master plans? They are supposed to now.
The guidelines attempt to give meaning to the individually limited
but cumulatively considerable projects:
215. See, e.g., Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, -Cal. 3d-,
514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
216. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE. § 11549.6 (West Supp. 1972).
217. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21083(b) (West Supp. 1972).
218. Guidelines § 15081(b).
219. Id. § 15081(c) (1).
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A project may impact on two or more separate resources where
the impact on each resource is relatively small. If the effect of
the total of those impacts on the environment is significant, an
EIR must be prepared. This mandatory finding of significance
does not apply to two or more separate projects where the im-
pact of each is significant.220
The guidelines could be a meaning of the statutory language, but
one would not be surprised to find litigants willing to attack such a
narrow definition.
In several places, the guidelines indicate that when an EIR is to be
prepared, the proponent of the project may transmit information
"in the form of a draft EIR, but the responsible agency must examine
this draft and the information contained within it to assure itself of
its accuracy and objectivity... .... 21
CEQA requires that the guidelines include a list of classes of pro-
jects which have been determined not to have a significant effect on
the environment. The guidelines call these classes "categorical ex-
emptions," and some are controversial. New construction of resi-
dences or motels involving no more than four dwelling units, and
commercial buildings designed for less than 20 occupants, are ex-
cluded if not built in conjunction with two or more such units.
Utilities and accessory uses to such buildings are also excluded. 222
Environmental purists are unhappy with such exclusions.
While the statute includes the issuance of zoning variances, the
guidelines categorically exclude "side yard and set back variances not
resulting in the creation of any new parcel nor in any change in land
use or density."22 3 Since use variances are generally improper in Cali-
fornia,24 one would not expect to have to prepare an EIR except in
connection with a height variance.
A present controversial provision of NEPA is likely to become the
most controversial aspect of CEQA. The guidelines provide categori-
cal exemptions for: "actions taken by regulatory agencies, as author-
ized by state law or local ordinance, to assure the maintenance, restora-
tion, or enhancement of a natural resource, including but not limited
220. Id. § 15082(c).
221. Id. § 15085(a).
222. Id. § 15103.
223. Id. § 15105(a).
224. D. HAGMAN, C. MARTIN, & J. LARsON, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE §
7.49 (Supp. 1973).
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to wildlife preservation. 225 And for: "actions taken by regulatory
agencies, as authorized by state law or local ordinance, to assure the
maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of the environ-
ment."22 6 These provisions are the state equivalent of the federal
guidelines: "environmental protective regulatory activities concurred
in or taken by the Environmental Protection Agency are not deemed
actions which require the preparation of environmental statements
under section 102(2) (C) of the Act."' ' 7
Some authority indicates a refusal to exempt EPA from prepar-
ing an EIS for its regulatory activities. 22s For example, in Anaconda
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 229 EPA had published a rule under the Clean
Air Act which could have had the effect of putting a copper smelter
out of business. EPA argued that it could consider nothing other
than air purity under its powers; it could not consider other environ-
mental, social, or economic effects. EPA also claimed it was not re-
quired to prepare an EIS. For the federal district court, the issue was
an easy one. While admitting that Congress could exempt EPA, the
court said that the matter involved a rather simple syllogism:
Major Premise: All federal agencies must file a NEPA statement.
Minor Premise: EPA is a federal agency.
Conclusion: EPA must file a NEPA statement. 230
These kinds of lawsuits have led to the realization that NEPA is a
two-edged sword. Agencies charged with improving the environment
must prepare their own EIS's in connection with regulatory activity
aimed at preserving the environment. That could considerably delay
matters; moreover, when fully confronted with the impact of their
regulations on other environmental, economic, and social concerns,
225. Guidelines § 15107.
226. Id. § 15108.
227. CEQ, Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment,
§ 5(d), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
228. Barfield, Environment Report/Water Pollution Act Forces Showdown in
1973 Over Best Way to Protect Environment, 4 NAT'L J. 1871, 1874 (1972). See
also the North Carolina Governor's recommendations discussed at notes 107-08 and
accompanying text supra.
229. 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
Federal courts of appeal in the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have con-
cluded EPA is not subject to the EIS requirement. See, e.g., Buckeye Power, Inc.
v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 174 (6th Cir. 1973).
230. 352 F. Supp. at 697.
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it is very likely, assuming they are responsible, that the agencies will
back off rigorous pursuit of narrow environmental goals. If they do
not do so, what would lead to the assumption that the development-
oriented agencies will, being fully informed by their own EIS's, pay
any attention to the environmental aspects of those EIS's? And if
the courts begin to hold that a negative EIS means that a project
cannot be built, and if an EIS of an environmental regulatory agency
shows tremendous adverse externalities resulting from a regulation
to improve a narrow part of the environment, one would assume that
the courts would enjoin the regulation.
The guidelines indicate that categorical exemptions involving new
construction of small structures, minor alterations to land, altera-
tions in land-use limitations, and accessory structures may not apply
in all cases because such activities may produce a significant effect in
particularly sensitive environments. In addition, the exemptions "are
inapplicable when the cumulative impact of successive projects of
the same type in the same place, over time is significant-for example,
annual additions to an existing building"-though small additions
are usually a categorical exemption.-I
The guidelines, while pointing out that CEQA requires no public
hearings, nevertheless encourage widespread public participation, in-
cluding hearings. Hearings may be held in conjunction with normal
planning activities, and a draft EIR should be available for use at
the hearing. The hearing should occur at a time when the purposes
and goals of CEQA would be best facilitated, - 2 normally, at an early
date in a project's life. The guidelines can be modified, and the
Secretary of the Resources Agency expressed an intent to modify them
in August 1973. They are not likely to become less complicated, al-
though the Secretary expressed that hope.
J. Reactions to Guidelines
Predictably, the environmentalists were unhappy with the guide-
lines, particularly those features which did not have strong statutory
support. The categorical exemption for regulatory agencies was par-
ticularly disliked because it included such agencies as the Public
Utilities Commission, never a favorite of environmentalists. The
policy statement that environmental concerns were to be balanced
231. Guidelines § 15114.
232. Id. §§ 15164-15165
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by economic concerns also troubled environmentalists. While the
draft guidelines had included in the definition of "significant effect"
those projects which generated serious adverse public reaction or
would displace large numbers of people 2 3  the final guidelines left
those provisions out. The fact that building permits and final tract
maps generally required no EIR bothered environmentalists, as did
the failure of the guidelines to adopt the Friends dictum "if the ad-
verse consequences . . . can be mitigated . . . the proposed activity
... should not be approved. 23 4
But the planning agencies began to comply. In Los Angeles County,
public hearings were stopped on all zoning cases for nine weeks to
permit the staff to prepare the EIR's. The planning director recom-
mended that fees be increased and anticipated that all zoning cases
would take at least an additional 30 days for processing to permit
the public and other agencies to participate.235
II. A CRTIQuE
A. Some Very Hard Questions
1. Balance
One can grant that the environment has not been given its due in
the past and one can carry no brief for environmentally destructive
growth and yet still not support an ethic of physical environmental
protection that fails to balance economic and social needs. Both
growth and environmental protection excesses are wrong. Just as
we learned that "maximum feasible participation"230 of the poor in
the poverty program was bad public policy if construed to mean all
possible participation, it is not good public policy to apply NEPA's
observance of national environmental policy "to the fullest extent
233. Compare WAsir. REV. COD ANN. § 47.04.110 (Supp. 1972). In minimiz-
ing and eliminating "effects which are adverse to the... human environment....
[s]uch factors as the dislocation of people . . . residences . . . [and] businesses . . .
shall be considered .... ." Since California considers the human environment, dis-
location might well be considered a significant effect anyway; see note 162 and
accompanying text supra.
234. Dreyfuss, Ecologists Fear Loss of Important Weapon, Los Angeles Times,
Feb. 18, 1973, pt. 1, at 3, col. 5. The quoted language is from footnote 8 of the
court's opinion.
235. Donaldson, Zoning Hearings May be Halted for Ecology Reports to Catch
Up, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 11, 1973, pt. W, at 10, col. 1.
236. Economic Opportunity Act § 102(a) codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2791 (f) (1)
(1970)
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possible"2 7 as if it meant to "every" extent possible regardless of
the adverse externalities to everything else that matters.
Therefore, to the extent one believes NEPA and NEPA-like state
acts have merit at all, the preferred approach is to balance short and
long-term effects, to balance man-made environmental costs and bene-
fits against nature's costs and benefits, and to make social and eco-
nomic needs legitimate concerns.
2. Race and Poverty
If one looked at most environmental acts of the recent decade, or
of any decade, or if one looked at the application of NEPA and
NEPA-like state acts, one would find little of a wealth redistribution
feature about them. Most environmental problems are a matter of
aesthetics, and only the affluent can afford aesthetics. Of course,
everyone can benefit from clean air, and since the poor live where
it is dirtiest, they can benefit more than anyone. But a job to one psy-
chologically dying because he is un- or underemployed is a more
basic necessity than clean air. The poor may not be able to afford
the clean air benefit. Even a non-growth economy is a regressive
burden on the poor; their jobs go first in such a situation. And if
resources to preserve the environment are taken from programs that
might otherwise take care of the unemployed in a non-growth econ-
onmy, the burden is double. It is a triple burden if the financing of
the environmental protection programs constitute a regressive tax
on the poor. For example, suppose every automobile in America is
required to have a $200 smog device. That would be half the price
of a poor man's car, five per cent of a rich man's.
NEPA is supposed to require an EIS for proposed legislation. The
requirement is generally ignored. If environmental legislation were
subject to a cost-benefit analysis as it relates to the poor, what would
it show? Not much relative benefit to the poor, one might wager.
These thoughts are not unique with me, of course, nor are they
new. In the summer of 1969, I spoke with OEO officials about the
need to strengthen the environmental aspects of the National Health
and Environmental Law Program (NHELP), an OEO legal backup
center located at UCLA, so that the poor would have an effective
voice in dealing with the emerging environmental movement. Nine
days after NEPA became law, in a paper entitled "The Environ-
237. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
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mentalists v. the Poor,"2.13 I thought through a scenario of what the
new environmental movement meant to the poor. I tried to deliver
the message to OEO officials in succeeding months. We agreed that
the concerns of then-fledgling institutions such as EPA were not of
primary interest to the poor; but the OEO officials, being too close
to the poverty movement, did not seriously believe the environmen-
talists could take over. It was a politically stupid move. OEO re-
jected advice that poverty problems should be redefined as environ-
mental problems. For example, rats in the central cities could have
been redefined as a solid waste problem, and OEO officials concerned
with rat bites could then be in a position to work with the solid
waste fraternity.
As OEO's resources dried up in accord with my scenario, OEO be-
came less and less able to relate to the environmental movement;
OEO officials became more bitter. I finally gave up and shifted my
attention to EPA. If the poverty types could not be persuaded to
take an interest in the environment, perhaps the environmental types
could be persuaded to take an interest in poverty. An EPA employee
had recently supervised the writing of "Our Urban Environment
and Our Most Endangered Species," 239 an account showing that en-
vironmental degradation is a more crushing burden on the poor
than on others. Columnist Jack Anderson 2 40 embarrassed EPA by
recounting the suppression of the Report, so it was finally released;
the EPA employee who supervised its writing was discharged.
I thought that EPA could be persuaded to give some attention to
the poor as a matter of good politics. But despite an initially favor-
able reaction to my plea for EPA resource help for NHELP,241 my
letters and calls about the progress of the proposal went unanswered
and, with considerable bitterness, I abandoned the project. EPA no
longer needed the poor. Early in 1973, my scenario was complete: the
President tried to abolish OE0 242 and would have but for judicial
intervention.2 3
238. D. Hagman, Jan. 9, 1970 (unpublished).
239. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcTIoN AGENCY, OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT AND
OUR MOST ENDANGERED SPECIES (Sept. 1971).
240. Columns in Washington Post and other newspapers, Dec. 10, 1971, and
Dec. 12, 1971.
241. Letter from Donald Hagman to William Ruckelshaus, Mar. 6, 1972.
242. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THn BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 122 (1973).
243. Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60
(D.D.C. 1973).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/2
NEPA EFFECTS
Even if EPA did become subject to NEPA21 and was therefore re-
quircd to obtain agency comment on its proposals, only a demoralized
OEO was around to comment for the poor. That is not to say, of
course, that NEPA and NEPA-like state acts could not be administered
to take concerns of the poor into consideration. But are they being
so administered?
Read Silva v. Romney, :4 5 in which the First Circuit upheld an
injunction against a low-income housing developer from proceed-
ing with his project because he asked for HUD assistance and there-
fore had to await preparation of an EIS. That case looks like the
now legions of other cases on exclusionary land-use control prac-
tices. '- Exclusionary land-use controls being invalidated, the ex-
cluders now are turning to the environmental acts to accomplish
their purposes. W\as plaintiff Silva motivated by concern for the
environment or by a concern that poor blacks would be moving into
hi, neighborhood? If both concerns are the same, let us not avoid
the problem of classism and racism by dressing it in environmental
clothing.
Town of Groton v. Laird- r illustrates that some courts will not
allow NEPA to be used to justify exclusionary practices. Groton is
a resort town with a housing shortage in all but high-rent units.
The Navy wished to build a 300-unit housing project in an area
ioned for residential densities lower than the Navy had in mind.248
While the Navy concluded that the project was a major one under
NEPA, it also concluded that the impact would not be significant.
Indicating that the determination was not arbitrary, capricious, abu-
si%'e of discretion, or unlawful, the court upheld the Navy and, in
dictumn, indicated it would do so even if the Navy had to meet a
substantial evidence test.
241. See notes 225-30 and accompanying text supra.
215. 473 F.2d 287 (Ist Cir. 1973).
246. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
L w . 242 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN].
247. 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972). See also Hiram Clarke Civic Club,
Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973) where, after conventional exclu-
sionary devices were tried, opponents invoked NEPA to bar a HUD-financed low-
income housing project by demanding preparation of an EIS. The court upheld
a HUD determination that the 272-unit project did not have such a significant
environmental impact as to require the preparation of an EIS.
248. Of course, the court properly notes that the Navy is not subject to local
zoning. 353 F. Supp. at 350. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text infra.
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In its determination of significance, the Navy found that no ad-
verse effect on humans was anticipated. The court was not apologetic
about this humanistic rather than physical view of the environment.
Since Groton had zoned for residential uses, the court found that a
project with slight increases in densities (but with no high rise) was
not an impact in "'excess of those created by existing uses in the
area.'-249 Such a conclusion is a bit dubious because it would lead
one to conclude that a project built in an area could have no sig-
nificant effect if it was planned for the area.
But the court focused its environmental eye on the human environ-
ment of Navy personnel: "NEPA may not be used by communities
to shore up large lot and other exclusionary zoning devices that price
out low and even middle-income families."250 While the court ad-
mitted NEPA elevated environmental values, the court said that
"[p]eople have to have somewhere to live."2 1 The court's reaction
to the Groton attorney's suggestion that the Navy consider a site in
another town was that the "suggestion smacks of trying to dump
the problem into someone else's backyard ... ,252 Moreover, the
court noted, the alternative site would involve longer commutes,
with attendant traffic and air pollution. 253
Consider who pays the cost of preparing the EIR in California,
where it can now be passed on to the applicant; and consider who
suffers from the delay of another day in slum housing. Should the
cost of the EIR, which might be passed on to the developer in ordi-
nary circumstances, be passed on in the form of rents to the poor?
One is not sanguine, then, when HUD Assistant Secretary Jackson
says that "housers and environmentalists are really interested in the
same overall objective: the provision of decent, affordable housing
in a quality environment for all Americans."254 He gives some exam-
ples that document his thesis: an EIS can prevent the removal of
existing low- and moderate-income housing; parks in low-income
areas can be preserved from highways; low-income housing can be
249. 353 F. Supp. at 349, citing Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d
Cir. 1972).
250. 353 F. Supp. at 350.
251. Id. at 351.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Address by Samuel Jackson, Surburban Action Institute, Annual Con-
ference, reported in HUD News, HTJD No. 73-28, Jan. 17, 1973.
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kept out of areas where other planned public activities make the sites
undesirable.
But has NEPA and the NEPA-like state acts been used often
enough for those reasons? Are the cases brought to preserve parks
or to preserve parks for the poor? Has low-income housing been pro-
tected because plaintiffs were interested in low-income housing or
because they were against freeways? What is needed is to get the old
poverty warrior litigants to utilize NEPA and the NEPA-like state
acts and to stop regarding them as threats. They can be used to ac-
complish goals for the poor, even though they seldom have been.
Environmental activists should also begin litigating some suits under
NEPA to protect the poor, as people, and not just to protect the
physical, inanimate environment as if it were a value in itself. Most
NEPA cases have been brought by private groups and environmental
activists. They owe more sensitivity to the poor. After all, it was the
poverty lawyers who opened the door to holdings giving broad stand-
ing to plaintiffs, including environmental plaintiffs. Those same en-
vironmentalists owe something to the poor.
While environmental activists consider far-out extensions of NEPA
and NEPA-like laws, let them consider these thoughts. Is the failure
of a city to rid itself of slums and is the failure of the federal govern-
ment to provide funds for slum removal an activity which has a
significant adverse environmental impact? Does the building of
wall-to-wall high-income housing constitute a significant adverse effect
on the environment by creating economic ghettos? What is the ad-
verse effect on environment from a two hour per day average bus
trip to integrate schools, a problem which could be eliminated if
housing were economically integrated?
3. NEPA and NEPA-like State Acts: The Relation to Land-Use
Controls
The traditional local land-use control system has no power to con-
trol federal projects. The federal government is sovereign. Even a
federal permit, issued to a private entity for a particular location, of-
ten entitles the permittee to proceed regardless of local land-use con-
trols.2-- A few federal provisions direct federal agencies to consider
local planning and land-use regulations with respect to federal activi-
255. HIAoMAN § 70.
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ties, 256 but generally nothing in the local land-use control system
inhibits the federal development machines from plunging ahead.
211
The federal government does not have its own land-use control system.
There being little other restraint at the federal level, and because
of the evil of single-purpose federal agencies pursuing their narrow
aims with vigor, power, and money, land-use control traditionalists
regard NEPA as a step toward reining the federal agencies.
As with the federal government, few constraints bind state govern-
ments. 258 The states generally have no statewide planning and con-
trols; they merely enable local planning. Of course, state agencies
are not generally subject to local planning and controls. The state
agencies plunge narrowly ahead.
Just as NEPA and NEPA-like state laws might be regarded as
productive when applied to federal and state government develop-
ment activities, a case might be made for throwing some new NEPA-
like legislation at local and special districts engaged in development.
They, also, have never been well-disciplined by local planning-special
districts could generally override any objections of the general plan-
making governments, and the plan-making governments typically
ignored their own plans when that suited their purposes.
But a better alternative would also have been simpler-amend
traditional planning and control legislation to require more environ-
mental consciousness and to strengthen provisions 25D making general
purpose and special district governments subject to the then-environ-
mentally stronger traditional planning and land-use controls. That
route was seemingly part of the thinking behind CEQA as originally
enacted, 2G0 which required EIR's only when the general purpose
government had no conservation element. When they did have a
conservation element (thus strengthening environmental conscious-
256. Id. § 68.
257. That may change. The proposed Land Use Policy and Planning Assist-
ance Act, S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), provides:
Sec. 207(a). Federal programs, projects, and activities on non-Federal lands
significantly affecting land use ... shall be consistent with State land use pro-
grams which conform to the provisions of this Act, except in cases of over-
riding national interest, as determined by the President.
258. HAGMAN §§ 68-69.
259. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
260. See text at note 28 supra.
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ness) their projects had to accord with that element (thus subjecting
local government projects to general planning constraints).
But then came Friends.-'1 CEQA, surprisingly, was applied to the
issuance of a building and conditional use permit. Such an inter-
pretation made CEQA a complete redundancy of the traditional
land-use control system, which is primarily concerned with regulat-
ing private development. The fundamental error of the Supreme
Court of California, other than its prostitution of the English lan-
guage over the meaning of "project," was its obsequious attention
to NEPA. The court's logic was that whatever NEPA controlled,
CEQA controlled. Since NEPA applied to federally-permitted pri-
vate projects, CEQA applied to locally-permitted private projects.
The court completely missed the point that the federal government,
unlike local governments, has no land-use control system. Subse-
quently, the state legislature forgot the reason for the conservation
element provision and eliminated it.
The NEPA and NEPA-like state act theory and approach to land-
,se control is the antithesis of comprehensive land-use control. Local
planning and zoning is an outgrowth of nuisance law; NEPA and
NEPA-like acts reintroduce the concept with greater sensitivity. Un-
der nuisance law, a use or a project is judged either in one's imagina-
tion (preliminary injunction) or after it is built and its impact on
the surroundings is considered. If the adverse externalities are too
great, the use or project is declared a nuisance and enjoined, forced
to mitigate externalities, or forced to pay damages. The planning
and zoning system, by contrast, is theoretically different. The plan
(master plan or as represented by the zoning) is adopted first. De-
velopment is then placed in accordance with this comprehensive plan.
If it does not fit the plan, it does not theoretically get built.
NEPA and NEPA-like state acts are like nuisance law in that the
project is first imagined in a particular place and then its relation
to the surroundings is judged. Of course, the judging is much more
sensitive and, at least to date, the project cannot be stopped if the
externalities are adverse. The only hope is that the project will not
be built if the men proposing it are rational and, as government
officials, will act only in the overall public interest.
The latter assumption, of course, is a large one. Almost all of the
litigation to date has been over the fact that an EIS had not been pre-
261. See tcxt following note 115 supra.
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pared, was ignored, or was clearly inadequate. No case has yet clearly
decided that where the EIS is adequate, is read, and shows adverse
externalities, but the project proposer goes ahead anyway, the project
can be enjoined. As agencies learn that they must prepare and read
the EIS's, they will do so. But we do not know that they will there-
fore act as responsible men or that they will be forced by courts to
so act. Prepared at enormous expense for each project, the EIS's may
be just so much paper work.
Consider what could be done for master planning in this country
if all the resources now being devoted to EIS's were devoted to plan-
ning. The resources for planning would, one might suspect, be in-
creased tenfold. There would be money to do the environmental
work and to develop plans which would be timely and well-consid-
ered. Projects could then be judged in relation to a good plan that
had already comprehensively made all the environmental, social,
and economic trade-offs. An EIS, beginning as it does with a par-
ticular project in relation to the whole world, practically requires
consideration of the same things as a plan. The difference under
an EIS system is that as the second and third projects come along,
they, too, must be studied afresh. It is a ridiculous waste of resources.
At the time the California legislature was passing CEQA, it was
also passing the strongest planning-regulation consistency laws in
the country. In recent years, in unprecedented steps, the California
legislature has required that every city and county, including chart-
ered cities, adopt a general plan.26 2 Several elements of these manda-
tory plans must be completed by a certain date,203 the date-setting
also being unprecedented. Subdivision maps can be approved only
if consistent with applicable general or specific plans. 2 4 Zoning ordi-
nances must be consistent with a general plan by a certain date.205
Such legislation is absolutely unrealistic.
If all the planners in America were enticed to California, good
plans could not be produced as the legislature has directed. And,
of course, all planners in America will not be attracted because no
one has provided the tenfold increase in funding necessary to pre-
pare these crash plans. So the scene was bad enough before Friends
262. CAL. GoV'VT CODE §§ 65300, 65302, 65700 (West Supp. 1972).
263. For present provisions on local projects see id. §§ 65561(d), 65563-65564.
264. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11526.1 (West Supp. 1972).
265. CAL. GOV'T CODE §658 6 0(a) (West Supp. 1972).
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imposed and CEQA, as amended, added the duty on planning agen-
cies to prepare EIR's on all significant, locally-permitted private
projects. Indeed, even the guidelines for all this planning are to
come from essentially the same state agency working on the CEQA
guidelines, 6,O an agency that traditionally has enjoyed a handful of
planning positions. Thus the state-ordered planning is somewhat
inadequate because both state and local planning agencies are busy
drafting guidelines and preparing and reviewing EIR's.
Perhaps, however, with all this work emanating from CEQA and
with all the planning and planning-regulation consistency law re-
quirements, there is one bright note in this critique. These laws
(and some others which would make the story too long) might be
justified if they were known as the "Planners and Lawyers Unem-
ployment Relief Acts of the 1970's."
The emphasis on the physical factor further points out the regres-
sive nature of CEQA theory as an environmental management tool.
Since its beginning, local planning has been trying to shed its domi-
nant concern with the physical, so that planning would include social
and economic considerations. CEQA, largely, puts us back with the
physical.
Further, the EIS can be employed as just another stop in a long
chain of required permits-grading, subdivision, sewer, zoning, build-
ing, occupancy, etc. This development would be counter to a grow-
ing movement to have a one-stop development permission system.
Many bites at the apple waste resources and defeat expectations.
Given their inadequate resources, even environmental groups might
prefer to concentrate their opposition on one stage rather than many.
Of course, if the EIS system is administered so that a favorable EIS
makes all subsequent permits virtually automatic, it might accom-
plish much of what the one-stop service movement is seeking.
It is interesting to note that the most recent observable trend is
to do just what the above suggests. Despite considerable federal and
state legislation on air, water, and noise pollution, and the NEPA
266. The California Office of Planning and Research prepares guidelines under
CEQA, CAL.. PuB. REs. CODE § 21083 (West Supp. 1972). CEQA guidelines
are adopted by the California Resources Agency. Id. § 21082. Most of the plan-
ning-related guidelines come from the California Council on Intergovernmental
Relations which works so closely with the Planning and Research Office as to
make them virtually indistinguishable. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 34211-34219 (West
Supp. 1972).
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and NEPA-like state laws, there is a perceived inadequacy that we
have not yet put it all together. The proposed solution is the Land
Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act,267 which is basically de-
signed to invigorate state and local land-use control as the vehicle to
put not only the environment together but also economic and social
factors.
Despite the reader's conviction by this point that the author is an
unreconstructed land-use control traditionalist, nothing could be
further from the truth. The author has enough familiarity with the
traditional land-use control system to regard it with contempt. The
above comments are for those policymakers who regard things like
comprehensive planning as important, and who should therefore be
advised of the inconsistency of their actions in requiring both plans
and EIS's.
I think general plans should be scrapped. In their place we need
a highly computerized information system that produces utilizable
information in a highly readable way that is made available to de-
cision-makers so that they can make ad hoc decisions based on the
best information available at the time.268 In a way, that is what an
EIS is. But EIS's are not organized into any system. If we had a
mechanism for putting all EIS's on a computer that could retrieve
all their accumulated information, make it available for the next
case, permit us to tell decision-makers what the future will look like
given their alternative choices, and then let them make the decision
fully informed-that would be such a system. Yet it appears no such
system is developing, except, one would suppose, in the private plan-
ning firms with EIS consultants who reuse EIS boiler plate just as
they reused master plan boiler plate.
If a philosopher-king had all the money that goes into master
plans plus all the money going into EIS's, both of which have a half
life of about ten minutes, what an information system we could
havel If such a system were to develop out of the present planning-
EIS controversy, the struggle would be worth it.
In a way, all CEQA does to the traditional system, both as to local
public works and locally-permitted private projects, is to say "we
267. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
268. My position is summarized in Hagman, Implementation of Land Use
Planning in the Political Process, LAND USE PLANNING 128 (T. Box ed. 1972),
reproduced in part in D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN
AND LAND DEVELOPMENT ch. 6 (1973).
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really mean it." We really mean that you should take environmental
considerations into account, as you supposedly always have been re-
quired to do. All that CEQA adds is that local public works agencies
will now prepare an EIR, and it will be reviewed by the planning
agency that will also prepare its traditional report. All that CEQA
adds to private projects is that the planning agency will prepare (or
require the developer to prepare) and review an EIR in addition to
the traditional documents. If that is all that has been accomplished,
it would seem that a simple amendment to the planning and land-
use control laws would have been a more appropriate approach.
That approach I call the "five little words approach." It comes
from a similar approach that I prefer for handling matters of re-
gional concern. Rather than create the elaborate state or regional
planning mechanism we now seem destined to create, I would prefer
five words in all planning and land-use control legislation: "in ac-
cordance with regional considerations." If that kind of language
had been in planning and land-use control legislation all these years
(and it has not), and if some environmental activists had persuaded
a few courts to take heed (and they could have), we would not be
entering the last half of the decade with our planning agencies and
commissions still being managed by public officials who think the
relevant public they serve ends at the boundary lines of the govern-
ments for which they work. To implement CEQA ideas, the five little
words approach suggests amending the planning and land-use con-
trol laws to say, in effect, "pay more attention to the environment."
B. Some Easier Questions
We might reflect on some rather obvious points to be made about
NEPA-like state acts. By now, states should have the issues focused
clearly as to whether these acts should include local governments and
publicly-permitted private activities. The vagueness of the first gen-
eration statutes about these issues can no longer be justified on the
grounds that the legislators wanted to do something good about the
environment, or that deliberate vagueness is sometimes appropriate
in new legislation in order to gain some experience. The earlier acts
now look as if they just copied NEPA without any real thought as
to what they were to accomplish.
In developing second generation acts, in light of the comments
of the previous section, one might want to consider whether a balance
in environmental, economic, and social dimensions is appropriate,
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whether the acts should be modified to the extent they are being
used in exclusionary roles, and whether the NEPA-like goals could
better be accomplished by amending the planning and land-use con-
trol enabling legislation rather than having separate legislation.
There is a growing body of experience on the issue of who should
prepare and review EIS's. Leaving that role generally to the develop-
ment agencies seems untoward. Reports are likely to be more thought-
ful if some general purpose agency, directed to broad environmental
goals, is assigned the task with adequate staff and funds to prepare
EIS's or at least to review them.
Those acts that require an EIS for a legislative proposal yet ex-
clude an EIS for an environmental agency's regulatory action should be
reviewed, particularly in light of the North Carolina study.20O The stop
or slow-growth environmentalists are troubled about requiring regu-
latory actions to be subjected to EIS's. Where the regulatory agency
is like the Army Corps of Engineers, which gives permits to discharge
refuse (meaning any discharge in rivers), environmentalists might
applaud the fact that the Corps has to prepare EIS's on permits,27°
since discharge meanwhile would be delayed. Environmentalists
might oppose extending the EIS requirement to agencies such as
EPA, since their regulations move toward a cleaner environment.271
Public participation in the EIS process appears to be increasingly
recognized as desirable. This is the kind of matter on which one can
have a particular position on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and
a different position on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. My posi-
tion on the first three days is that public participation is a good
thing. My position on the next three days is that we should have
sensibly bounded general purpose governments capable of making
trade-offs, that these governments should be officered by persons sub-
ject to rigorous conflict-of-interest laws, that they should be elected
under restrictive campaign contribution laws, and that these govern-
ments then should be allowed to govern. Public participation by
special interest groups may merely lead to more fragmentation of
governments, which is the curse of most geographical areas.
The definition of the size of projects that have a significant effect
on the environment is an important matter. One should realize that
269. See notes 104-105 and accompanying text supra.
270. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
271. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, note 229 and accompanying text supra.
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if small developments are included, resources may not be available
to conduct adequate reviews of important environment-befouling
activities.
Some states incorporate NEPA or its guidelines. That might be
considered. Alternatively, where states have strong NEPA-like state
acts, the federal government might consider having its agencies com-
ply with the state acts. Such a step would be somewhat similar to
the approach of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, which
does not apply in certain states that have equivalent or stricter legis-
lation.7* 2
Generally, the notion that the development agency or private de-
veloper should pay the cost of the EIR preparation by the environ-
mental agencies seems desirable. Alternatively, the environmental
agencies might be better funded with general funds. Preferred
projects, such as low-income housing, should not be forced to absorb
these costs, which can be considerable.
Whether or not agencies should be allowed to proceed if the re-
port is adverse is an interesting problem. If they are allowed to pro-
ceed, EIS preparation may be a wasteful exercise. On the other hand,
if the EIS covers only the physical environment or covers only a lim-
ited part of the rest of the environment, agencies should be allowed
to proceed if the general public weal represented by economic or
social considerations is overwhelming. If there is an adequate review
process that assures that the agency is not identifying its weal as the
public weal, an adverse environmental report should not by that con-
clusion alone force adandonment of the project.
POSTSCRIPT*
In connection with the earlier discussion on race and poverty, one
should acknowledge that there are states which are both poor and
272. 15 U.S.C. § 1708 (Supp. 1973).
* Professor Hagman's postscript, added immediately prior to publication, sum-
marizes recent activity relating to NEPA-like state laws.
Virginia, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Maryland have all enacted NEPA-like
state acts. North Carolina extended its act's operation from 1973 to 1977. Re-
,ised guidelines for CEQA have been proposed by the Resources Agency of Cali-
fornia. Arizona, Michigan, New York, Texas, and Vermont have applied NEPA-
like concepts to some actions through policy statements by agencies or executive
orders. The Council of State Governments has developed a model NEPA-like
state law.
Cases decided in California, Washington, and New Mexico have made it clear
that state courts are not going to emasculate the state statutes. State and local
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environmentally degraded, so that it is possible to be both simul-
taneously. One must agree that the poor should not win every time
and that it is possible to redistribute wealth and clean up the environ-
ment at the same time. But the former is difficult when there is a
lack of will to do so. If there were poverty law firms these days with
access to resources sufficient to compel redistribution of wealth either
by confrontation with environmentalists or in other ways, environ-
mental activism could then be more applauded. Balance is the goal.
And environmentalists, as all activists, must curb their tendency to
win battles in the name of a quality life when quality is defined in
single-faceted terms.
As other states joined California in adopting NEPA-like state laws,
it remained unclear whether the EIS system could be justified on a
cost-benefit analysis basis. That is, while everyone can be for raising
environmental consciousness, was the EIS system the way to do it?
Was too much emphasis being given to the physical environment?
Were the EIS's just busy work? Were they speaking meaningfully as
they were ground out of suddenly formed consultant offices? If EIS's
were speaking, was anyone listening?
The cost is considerable. A visiting lecturer in my urban planning
class indicated that Orange County, California hired 15 persons to
prepare and review EIR's since Friends made CEQA meaningful.
The City of Los Angeles estimated that the EIR process would cost
the city as much as $865,000 in 1973 and proposed to charge fees
ranging from $30 to $1,000 per application to administer the system
with respect to private development. In Beverly Hills, California,
a fully developed city of about 33,500 persons, veteran city council-
men claimed they were totally confused about the EIR requirement.
Meanwhile, they were being asked to approve hiring three new clerks
and three new associate planners to handle EIR's. They were told
consultants were charging $30 to $50 per hour to prepare EIS's and
that even routine reports were costing $2,500. There was a backlog
of 35 projects needing EIR's in Beverly Hills.
Was the cost worth it? Another visiting lecturer reported that he
had suggested a delay in the approval of his client's project before the
Los Angeles City Council because the council members had not seen
agencies, as was the case with federal agencies, have tried various strategies to
avoid the state acts, but the agencies have not prevailed. Thus the statutes have
been broadly interpreted and applied.
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and did not have the city's EIR on the project before them during
the hearing. The attorney feared the oversight would cause his client
difficulty in subsequent litigation. But the president of the council
told the attorneys that the report was accepted and to proceed.
It may be unfair to suggest that EIR's are not effective just because
the final decision-makers do not read them. Perhaps they are read
carefully by staff persons who are thus influenced in making their
recommendations.
An attorney in private practice who was on retainer to several cities
in California reported that most cities had an approved list of en-
vironmental consultants to which private developers were directed.
He noted that only consultants who came up with favorable EIR's
enjoyed much business.
This postscript also permits some further comment on the relation
of traditional land-use controls to the EIR system. First, while CEQA
has no such express requirement, the guidelines for CEQA define
the term "project" to include the adoption of local general plans or
elements thereof. The guidelines are legally correct. The adoption
of a general plan or an element thereof dearly appears to be a dis-
cretionary, major action that could have a significant effect on the
environment, though given the traditional disregard for master plans,
the effect of a plan may be little more than theoretical. It is clear
that plans in California are presently intended to be strong docu-
ments. Thus, while it may be untoward that a comprehensive plan,
which is to balance socio-economic-physical matters, must itself dance
to the unifaceted tune of concern with the physical environment, not
nuich more can be said in criticism that has not already been said.
If society wishes to shift from an extreme of little attention to physi-
cal environmental matters to an overbearing attention, that is a de-
cision society has power to make however ill-advised.
Secondly, a relation between general plans and EIR's is discussed
in a new California guideline document explaining how general
plans should be made. The document suggests how the matters to
be contained in an EIR are to be applied with respect to general
plan-making. If all of those matters are included in the planning
process, the general plan can contain its own impact statement. No
one can seriously object to a consideration of EIR's in connection
with the planning process, for such matters have always been theo-
retically part of the process anyway. CEQA just says it again.
Lastly, the new California guidelines deal with the suggestion that
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if environmental trade-offs are made in the general plan, there is no
necessity of having another EIR for particular projects in conformance
with the plan. The guidelines state, however, that this approach
attributes greater foresight to the general plan than its nature and
time-frame make possible. The guidelines continue with language
that seems to limit the environmental review at the project level to
the more specific, immediate, localized environment. The guidelines
make the right choice.
It is not traditional to load all decision-making in the plan. Typi-
cally, all particular development permissions and projects are re-
viewed to determine their propriety; conformity with the plan is not
the exclusive test. The proper weight to be given to the plan vis-h-vis
immediate considerations is a difficult issue. The EIR process does
not change the nature of the issue unless the EIR process on the
specific project is so broad that it involves a de facto redoing of the
plan for every project. The guidelines remove much of my earlier
concern on the matter.
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